Kant’s account of judgements of the beautiful
I intend to argue that Kant’s judgement of the beautiful imposes an implicit or potential experience of the sublime; that is the sublime as Kant himself describes it:
“the sublime by contrast, is to be found in a formless object insofar as limitlessness is represented in it, or at its instance, and yet it is also thought as a totality: so that the beautiful seems to be taken as the presentation of an indeterminate concept of the understanding, but the sublime as that of a similar concept of reason.”
Kant p.128
First let us define beauty, there are two concepts of beauty; neither is mutually exclusive, but each is rather like one of the poles of a magnet. One pole conceives beauty as imbued with lightness, balance and order, and having a sort of decorative quality; the other pole conceives beauty more often as allied with profundity and truth. This latter is a much darker concept of beauty which I would perceive to be contained within the sublime. Distinguishing between these extremes of beauty has less to do with the objects of appreciation - whether that be a rose, a sunset, a poem, a painting or a piece of music - than it has to do with the attitude of the individual appreciating the object (the appreciator). Therefore, anything that is possessed of the first kind of beauty must also be possessed of the second kind, that is, if the appreciator’s attention is sufficiently well directed, and if he or she has a degree of awareness of the constituent of the sublime within the beautiful. The second concept of beauty, the one allied with depth and truth, does not fit into Kant’s categories of the beautiful and the sublime as laid out in the Critique of Judgment; his analysis of the beautiful and the sublime yield a much more complex notion of beauty that Kant himself puts into words.
That which arouses the sense of the beautiful in us Kant defines as “purposiveness without purpose”; what does he mean by this? As far as I can read it, the categories of understanding are classificatory principles which order the sensory perceptions into practical structures of our everyday world. To find something useful in our everyday world, one structured in a way that suits both our understanding and some deeper need, is something we find gratifying. We take pleasure in the purposive form of, for example, a well designed screwdriver because we know that we can put it to good use. Whereas in the concept of beauty we recognize the same model of purposiveness in an object, we are cognoscente and appreciative of the structure and deliberation in the object, but the object in itself has no useful human purpose. So, we might say that an object is beautiful, as opposed to useful, specifically for the reason that it is imbued with certain characteristics that we can identify with usefulness, however, the object itself remains useless. So, Kant is arguing that it is because of this that our position with regard to beautiful objects is strictly disinterested, no matter to what degree its facet of purposiveness brings us pleasure.
“A flower, by contrast, e.g. a tulip, is held to be beautiful because a certain purposiveness is encountered in our perception of it which, as we judge it, is not related to any end at all.”
Ibid. p.120
By contrast, according to Kant, the sublime is a principle of disorder, of purposivelessness; it is the occurrence of our mind coming into contact with something that it cannot categorize or encompass. It cannot resolve any bounding organizing principle within the object because it finds it impossible to determine the object’s limits. The mind cannot determine the limits of the object because it challenges the imagination’s presentative powers; it is beyond imaginative power to present a sensible form to the understanding, and the powers of understanding are unable to make sense out of nothing. Therefore both the imagination and the understanding fail us when confronted with the sublime; and if this is the case then the sublime represents disorganization. A disorganization that is not simply an external arbitrary disorganization, rather it suggests an internal systemic disorganization, and it is our inability to bring order the perceived object that fosters the sense of disorganization; and this threatens us and our notion of ourselves as ordered and ordering entities. Kant identifies beauty with a quality, purposiveness, but associates the sublime with an unlimited quantity; beauty is calming, but the sublime perturbs us. Kant describes the purposiveness of the beautiful as “preadaptable to our judgement, and thus constitutes in itself an object of satisfaction.” On the sublime Kant argues that the purposivelessness of the sublime is the opposite as it seems “to violate purpose in respect of the judgment, to be unsuited to our presentative faculty“; he goes on to say that to encounter the sublime “does violence to the imagination.“
Kant argues that pleasure derived from the sublime is a “negative pleasure”; it is a pleasure that does not come from the sublime itself, it is more indirect, but from our feeling of relief upon our realization that this external disorder is not a threat to our internal order. That is, our recognition of an alternative purposiveness, which is identified by reason, and is independent of worldly threats, what Kant calls our “supersensible destination” which is to be good, i.e. moral. When Kant says:
The feeling of the inadequacy of our capacity for the attainment of an idea that is a law for us is respect. Now the idea of the comprehension of every appearance that may be given to us into the intuition of a whole is one enjoined on us by a law of reason, which recognizes no other determinate measure, valid for everyone and inalterable, than the absolute whole.”
Ibid. p.140
he seems to be arguing that an encounter with the unthinkable in the sublime highlights our inadequacies and our need to make ourselves adequate with regard to the notion of the moral law. Therefore, the sublime brings us to an acknowledgement that there is an alternative purpose other than the purpose which is susceptible to the threats of the world, that is, to be moral. With regard to that purpose, if an object can be perceived as posing no threat to us we are able more easily to perceive the object disinterestedly; any pleasure is derived from the knowledge of our inherent safety with regard to the perceived threat, Kant describes this pleasure of the sublime as a sort of joy, “the pleasurableness arising from the cessation of an uneasiness is a state of joy.“
Kant makes a comparison of the sublime and the beautiful thus:
“we must seek a ground outside ourselves, but for the sublime merely one in ourselves and in the way of thinking that introduces sublimity into the representation of the former - a very necessary introductory remark, which entirely separates the ideas of the sublime from that of a purposiveness of nature,“
Ibid. p.130
So, the beautiful is extrovert in its nature, whilst the sublime is introvert; it seems that here Kant is arguing that the experience of the sublime is a secondary aesthetic experience to that of beauty. Kant’s argument appears to be that the sublime is secondary to beauty because the experience of beauty is magnanimous, directing our attention outwards to the purposiveness of nature, whilst the sublime is simply directing our attention within to our inner purposiveness. Kant argues that neither art nor nature - in the positive purposive sense - are appropriate objects of the sublime, in his terms “rude nature”. I would argue that many things, from flowers to sunsets, poems to songs, can induce feelings of the sublime; therefore, I would disagree with Kant that the sublime is secondary to the beautiful in terms of the aesthetic experience, even though I would accept that its most powerful manifestation is in union with the beautiful.
There is a relationship between the sublime and the beautiful to which Kant does not refer, but which is contained within his own analysis of these concepts. If we accept Kant’s explanation of beauty, purposiveness without purpose, maybe we can forge the link between beauty and the sublime. Kant argues that the distinguishing feature of beauty is the quality of purposiveness, but beauty for Kant is purposiveness without purpose, so, if the quality of beauty is purposiveness, this means that the very essence of beauty is that it is without purpose. Therefore, the common ground between beauty and things that we find pleasing is purposiveness, however, what sets beauty apart is that an object has purposiveness but is without purpose; so it is not purposiveness alone that makes beauty, although it is necessary, but that the object is, ultimately, without purpose. Therefore if an object is, for us, without purpose it is purposeless which, in turn, means that it is purposiveless; so although and object can have the quality of purposiveness further examination reveals it to be actually purposiveless.
I share with Kant, although he expresses this more indirectly than I shall do here, the view that the concept of purposivelessness can be linked to the sublime. To make the shift from the beautiful to the sublime one has to confront this essential feature of the beautiful, its ultimate purposivelessness; this is a confrontation that our mind cannot organize, contain or make any sense of. Our imagination stretches out, but is unable to distinguish boundaries, thus its integrity is threatened and we have a feeling of some close, very real but unspecified danger. The mind then works to defend itself against this perceived threat; it reflects, reframes, takes a step back as it were, and reason is engaged; when this happens the feeling is one of relief at the cessation of the threat. This subsequent feeling of joy is the experience of the sublime in the beautiful. I would argue that it is possible to experience the beautiful without the sublime; to be impressed and pleased by the light and colour, the harmony and proportions in a painting by, say, Manet, to experience the purposiveness and order is a good experience and a sufficient one. To reach the sublime from here requires some effort to effect a confrontation with an ultimate purposivelessness; some artists appear to work harder than others to draw out the experience of the sublime from the beautiful, Cezanne for example. One can just as easily experience the unbounded sublime in forms found in nature, as Kant suggests in powerful waterfalls or overhanging rocks.
So in conclusion, when an aesthetic experience of the beautiful triggers a path of reflection beginning with a sense of order and harmony, but which becomes a search for a context for this order and harmony, this is when the contemplation of the beautiful shifts towards an experience of the sublime. This contextual search for order and harmony becomes a contextual search of the person, a search for one’s own purposiveness, a search within oneself, for one’s own place; this in turn becomes a philosophical search ending in an experience of the sublime. It is only then that the aesthetic experience comes close to the philosophical, because the end is delight no longer, rather it is akin to truth, truth about ourselves and out place in the system. Beauty’s purposiveness, then, seduces the individual into a search to test the meanings we are comfortable with, and which we take for granted; such confrontation of the sublime in the beautiful is both disturbing and cathartic. It is disturbing in that it shakes us from our disposition to disregard; but cathartic in that it opens up a new sensitivity towards our lives and the lives of those around us.
Bibliography:
Kant, Immanuel. 2000. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.