An Aesthetic Dilemma

The Aesthetic Dilemma of the Forgery as a Work of Art.

My intentions here are to explore what I have termed the "dilemma of the forgery", by which I mean not so much the moral dilemma, but more the aesthetic dilemma of the forged work of art and its relative lack of value and aesthetic merit, despite being possessed of the same or similar aesthetic qualities as a genuine work of art. This raises the philosophical question of whether a perfect forgery is of any less value, or aesthetic merit, than an original work of art. Here I will just consider forgeries of the plastic and graphic arts – paintings, sculptures, etc. I will start out by considering the uniqueness of these works of art, as the other art forms – music, literature etc. – have a different form of uniqueness. That is not to say that there cannot be forgeries of any type of artwork that is not a physical object. Copies of novels, poems, and symphonies are not thought of as forgeries. However, original manuscripts can be forged, and imitations written in the style of a particular author or composer can be passed off as genuine. Then moving on to formulate what might serve the purpose as a definition of forgery and its relationship with genuine, or authentic, works of art.

To begin with it is important to distinguish between different types of forgery. The two basic types are the perfect copy, and the painting in the style of a famous artist. An exact copy of a work of art – the producer of which I will label "copyist" for ease of distinction – would be a forgery of the first type, although its intention plays a part in whether it should be called a forgery. Works of art executed in the style of a particular artist and which deceive the art experts, are examples of the second type of forgery, from the point of view that there was no original from which they were copied. At this point I pick up the moral issue that such forgeries, by their nature, involve an attempt to deceive viewers about their origins. I intend to set aside these moral issues as I see no link between them, important though they are, and the aesthetic dilemma of the forgery being scrutinized here. I then raise the question of when a work actually becomes a forgery rather than a copy, although even a copy is a forgery of a type. Whilst the copyist may have the mechanical skills of the artist whom he/she has copied, this artist's achievement should not be reduced merely to their skill as a craftsperson. The copyist in slavishly copying (forgeries of the first type) can never hope to be a great artist, because he/she cannot be original in the way that the original artist was. In the case of a forger producing works in the style of a particular artist (forgeries of the second type) rather than actual copies of authentic works, there might be more grounds for comparing the forgeries' artistic merit, and that of the forger, with that of works by the original artist. This leads us nicely to the crux of the problem, the "dilemma", which is: should not forgeries have an equality with original works of art if they are of equal artistic merit?

In this discussion when I speak of a work of art it will be in terms of those works of art which are valued for their uniqueness, that is those works of art which may be identified with a single physical object, our appreciation of which is inextricably bound up with the knowledge that they are unique and are not possessed of a multiple existence. Works of great literature, music, etc. may in their own way be unique, for example, a novel, a play (dramatic or comedic), or a piece of music are all unique in the form of the original manuscript, but all such works are possessed of a multiple existence in so far as there are numerous copies of the work produced for public consumption. Obviously the actual manuscript of a play, novel, poem, or a piece of music could be faked in the first sense of the forgery. However, forgeries of the second type, for example of Shakespeare's plays, could be made by someone cleverly imitating a writer's style. However, the uniqueness of such works is not the same as it is in, say, a painting or a sculpture because of the multiple existence of such works. The argument could be put forward that, for instance, a painter executed several versions of the same subject and that in this way a painting could be said to have a multiple existence. This, however, does not deprive any of the individual versions of their uniqueness, as the probability is that each version will be slightly different in some way, either superior or inferior, to preceding versions and therefore each version will be possessed of its own uniqueness. The forgery, however, by its very existence undermines the uniqueness and originality of authentic works of art, not so much in an aesthetic manner, but morally. Even if someone managed to produce a work of art that was technically and stylistically indistinguishable from one by, say, Turner, it can be argued that this is a very different achievement from that of Turner himself. This uniqueness and originality is part of what we value about an artist's achievement, not simply the production of an isolated beautiful object, but rather the way in which an original style and a whole range of works are created, and it is this creativity which is such an important aspect of artistic merit. This originality is as much a part of the artist's achievement, as is the way the different works produced over his/her lifetime contribute to our understanding of each individual image produced. We can only fully appreciate this artistic achievement if each work can be placed in the context of his/her entire output. In the case of, say, forging a Turner the forger would not be creating an original style but rather copying an existing one, and it is this creativity of the original artist that we tend to value over the skill of an imitator. This should tell us that it might be unwise to consider the forger as having equality with the original artist just because he/she is capable of producing an impressive forgery. In this case surely the forgery would allow us to see evidence of Turner's genius rather than that of the forger. It can be argued that in the presence of a copy of an original painting, we can still appreciate the artist's merit through looking at the copy. Therefore, this is not so much an argument against the artistic value of forgeries as it is against the artistic merit of forgers.

Forgery is against the spirit of the uniqueness and originality of art; the forger who creates a work of art in the style of another artist is laying claim to an originality which can only belong to the artist whose style he/she is copying. At this point I think that it should be made perfectly clear that what is being discussed here is the forgery, that is a work produced with the intention to deceive, defraud, or to undermine the uniqueness of existing works; rather than the copy, that is a work executed by, say, a student with the intention of exploring the techniques and style of a particular artist. One reason to prefer originals to forgeries, or copies, is that we can never be certain whether or not a forgery is really a perfect one. Just because a forgery of a work of art is good enough to fool the experts now, it does not mean that it will fool future experts. The term forgery can only be defined in terms of reference to some contrasting concept which must include at least some notion of the genuine or the authentic; for if the genuine does not exist how can it be forged? So, even if we believed a perfect forgery would be of equal artistic merit to the original, we will never be entirely certain, given any actual instance of a forgery, that it is a really accurate copy. The whole concept of forgery is a negative one which implies the absence or negation of value; and in terms of artistic forgeries we are making judgments in the absence or negation of aesthetic values, for any aesthetic value must surely be completely independent of authenticity. In discussing the genuine, or authentic, versus the forgery what we are actually making is a judgment based on a non-aesthetic standard, and the realm of art is so infested with non-aesthetic standards of judgment that at times it is impossible to distinguish artistic from economic value, taste or fashion from true artistic excellence, and good artists from clever businessmen. Against this view it is worth pointing out that any differences that are likely to emerge between forgery and original will usually be very minor. Thus, in applying those non-aesthetic judgments by which we consider a work of art to be superior because it is genuine, or inferior because it is a forgery, we find that they have little or nothing to do with aesthetic judgment, which is being used in this argument, because aesthetic value and aesthetic experience remain completely independent of the question of authenticity. If at some later stage differences between forgery and original are seen to be emergent then can we ever be sure that any forgery is a perfect one. Therefore it is somewhat eccentric to suppose that such differences will be of a kind to substantially alter our views of the works artistic value.

It can be argued that the offence involved by the creation of a forgery is not so much against the spirit of aesthetics, or the spirit of morality as it is against the spirit of art, and as such, morally, the forgery completely lacks integrity. What is really wrong with forgeries is that by their nature they involve an attempt to deceive viewers about their origins. The concept of forgery is a moral or legal normative one, and as such refers to an object, not necessarily aesthetically inferior, the creation of which is seen to be morally offensive. A forgery would not be a forgery without the intent to deceive: it would be a copy, or an experiment in painting in the style of another artist, what is known as pastiche. It is partly because of the deception involved that forgeries are regarded as inferior to originals. But, having made this point, there may be good reason for keeping some moral and artistic questions separate for even a brilliant forgery, even though it does involve deception, may nevertheless still be impressive as a work of art. Therefore in discussing the forgery of a work of art – or even as a work of art – we should set aside the moral issues raised by forgeries, as these are more concerned with the artist who produces the forgery, and his/her intentions, than with the forgery itself. Whereas the forger who sets out to deceive and defraud, and who is concerned with personal gain, can be said to be either moral or immoral, the same thing cannot be said of the work of art that the forger produces. The work of art is the forger's means of deception, and as it is not a sentient entity can neither be judged to be moral nor immoral, it is only the purpose for which the forger produced it which is moral or immoral.

We are all aware that it is the influence of non-aesthetic criteria in the art world, such as fame of the artist, the monetary value of the work, particularly of a painting by a master painter, which is largely responsible for the existence of forgeries in the first place. Monetary value, value as a status symbol, and value as an artifact, have little or nothing to do with artistic merit. The first is concerned with scarcity, the changes in taste of collectors, and, probably most significantly, the motivation's of the art dealers; the second is a matter of social rivalry, the keeping one step ahead of the Jones' factor; the third is psychological and is concerned with the way we treat objects. If we take these three factors as arguments to explain the popular preference for original works of art over good forgeries, then perhaps good forgeries are really just as artistically significant as originals. Perhaps it is only the monetary motivation's of the art world, and their obsession with the worth of a work of art, which stimulates peoples interest in originals over good fakes. After all if there is only a single copy of each work of art then the art auctioneers have the motivation to sell each work for the highest price possible as a unique object. But if there are several copies of a work, then the price of each copy is likely to relatively lower, especially if there is no difference in status between the original and any extant copies. In the case of paintings this would, in effect, put them in the same position as prints. At this point we should pose the question: when does the copy cease to be a copy and become a forgery? The answer appears to lie in the intention for which the copy was produced. Let us take, for example, a goldsmith who produces an jewelled egg which is technically and stylistically indistinguishable from a Faberge egg. If it was produced as an exercise to explore the style and techniques of Faberge, or for a customer who wished to own such a object, and with no ulterior motive of deception in mind then it can reasonably be said to be a copy; and in this case we do tend to make a clear distinction between the copy (even though a copy is a forgery of a kind) and the original. On the other hand if the goldsmith produced the object with no other motive in mind than to pass it off as a previously undiscovered Faberge egg then it becomes a forgery, because its purpose is that of deception and the deliberate undermining of the unique status of works by Faberge. It is precisely because of the fame and high value of a work by a renowned artist that previously undiscovered by that artist are so highly praised and acclaimed as a valuable find by members of the art world; that is until it is exposed as a forgery. It is only at this point that the attitude towards such an object changes and it is judged, by those same members of the art world, to be worth only a fraction of its previous value and unworthy of public display.

Perhaps it is not just the financial motivation's of art dealers, but also the desire of art collectors for a status symbol which leads to the emphasis on original works of art rather than copies. There is a certain amount of one-upmanship for collectors to own a unique object: for them it is far more important to own an original work of art than to own a perfect copy of it, simply for its value as a status symbol, rather than any artistic value. Another motivation for owning originals is to do with their appeal as artifactuality, and of their fascination due to their direct contact with history. An original may be prized because this was an object which the great artist touched, paid attention to, put his artistic effort into, and so on; a forgery is not possessed of this particular quality. If we ignore these considerations perhaps it is possible to make the case for a forger to produce works in the style of an artist rather than slavish copies of existing works, in such a case there must be grounds for comparing the artistic merit of the forgery with that of works by the original artist. Also if the forgery is so proficient that it misleads the art world into the believing that it is what it appears to be, and stimulates their monetary motivation's, surely this is also evidence that the forgery is worthy of a high artistic status. It is only upon its discovery to be a forgery that its status as a work of high artistic merit is brought into question by those same members of the art world, who had previously heaped such high praise upon the work in question. These same people now judge to be virtually worthless, that which they had previously put such a high monetary value on, and treating it as somehow grubby and squalid, something to be hidden and not discussed much like the black sheep of the family. What is happening here is that the members of the art world are making plain and simple value judgments and giving no consideration to judgments of an aesthetic kind whatever; surely judgments of artistic merit are not about a work of arts "value", but about the technical and aesthetic prowess of the work under scrutiny, whether it be a forgery or an original work. I might be accused of being cynical at this point, but, in making such non-aesthetic judgments are we not saying that the reason for artists creating works of art is purely a financial one, that is a motive totally unconcerned with any other criteria which might be appropriate to apply to a work of art. Such an argument must in some way lead us away from value judgments and persuade us to make judgments not by non-aesthetic standards, but by aesthetic ones as it is only by such comparisons that we can consider the artistic merits of the forgery alongside works by the original artist. Thus, if the forger is capable of producing work of art – equally endowed with the same or similar aesthetic qualities as the original artist's work – which convinces experts that it is by the original artist, then surely the forger is equally as skilled as the original artist and should be treated with the same reverence, and any works produced by such forger treated equally as reverentially as works by the original artist. In such an instance surely the forger has produced a work which is technically and aesthetically indistinguishable from the works of the artist whom he/she has mimicked, otherwise the art world would not have been duped into accepting it as a genuine work of art. Therefore if we judge, on such aesthetic principles, a forgery not to be of high artistic merit, then are we not also saying that works of art by the artist whom the forger has mimicked are also not worthy of high artistic merit. Therefore, either the works of both the original artist and the forger are equally worthy of high artistic merit or neither are.

In conclusion I have explored what I have termed the "dilemma of the forgery", showing it to be an aesthetic dilemma of the forged works of art and their relationship to genuine works of art, whilst trying to answer the philosophical question of whether a perfect forgery is of any less value than an original work of art. The first consideration we made was the uniqueness and originality of such works of art, and that how copies of novels, poems, and symphonies etc. are not usually thought of as forgeries due to the multiplicity of their existence. Then we explored the difficulty of formulating a definition of forgery and its relationship with genuine, or authentic, works of art, and the difficulty of being able to distinguish between different types of forgery; the two basic types being the perfect copy, and the painting in the style of a famous artist. At this point we looked at the moral issue that forgeries by their nature involve an attempt to deceive viewers about their origins. The decision was to set aside these moral issues as it there was thought to be no link between them and the aesthetic dilemma of the forgery. The question was then raised as to when a work actually becomes a forgery rather than a copy showing that perhaps the difference between the copy and the forgery is one of intention. All of which brought us to the dilemma in question which is: should not forgeries have an equality with original works of art if they are of equal artistic merit? Hopefully it has been shown that if the forger is capable of producing work – equally endowed with the same or similar aesthetic qualities as the original artist's work – which convinces experts that it is by the original artist, then surely the forger is as skilled as the original artist and should be treated as that artist's equal. If this argument holds up to analysis then either the works of both the original artist and the forger are worthy of the status of high artistic merit or neither are. It has to be said that arguments can be made both for and against this position.