An Analysis of An Institutional Analysis of Art

George Dickie's Institutional Theory of Art.

It is evident from George Dickie's argument in 'Art and the Aesthetic' that he thinks his Institutional Theory is defensible. However I intend to argue that it is indefensible. My reasons for arguing the case for the indefensibility of the theory are: (i) because of its circularity; (ii) its reliance upon a privileged cognoscenti, who represent the artworld, to make decisions about what is and what is not art; (iii) its failure to distinguish good from bad art; and (iv) because the criteria used by the artworld are somewhat suspect.George Dickie formulated the institutional theory of art in which he explains how such varied things as a pile of bricks, a urinal labelled 'Fountain' etc., can be considered works of art. According to his theory the 'artworld' – Dickie uses the term artworld to refer to the broad social institution (a network of systems consisting of theatre, painting, sculpture, literature and so on) in which works of art have their place – has the authority to confer the status of 'work of art' on objects. In effect, it is the artworld's prerogative to decide which objects will be considered to have aesthetic value.

The theory states that there are two things which objects to be considered as works of art must have in common. First, that they all be artifacts: that is, they have all been worked on to some extent by human beings. Dickie uses the term 'artifact' in quite a loose way, according to him even a piece of driftwood picked up on the seashore could be considered an artifact if someone displayed it in an art gallery. Placing it in a gallery in order to get people to look at it in a certain way would count as working on it:

"Natural objects which become works of art in the classificatory sense are artifactualized without the use of tools – artifactuality is conferred on the object rather than worked on it. This means that natural objects which become works of art acquire their artifactuality at the same time that the status of candidate for appreciation is conferred on them".

This definition of an artifact is so loose as to add nothing important to the concept of art. Second, and more importantly, these artifacts have all had the status of candidacy for appreciation conferred upon them by some member or members (a privileged cognoscenti) of the art world, such as a gallery owner, a publisher, or an artist etc. In every case someone with the appropriate authority has had the privilege of conferring this status upon the artifacts.

Dickie argues that an artifact can acquire the status of candidate for appreciation in a way similar to that in which a person achieves the certification of being qualified for office, or more simply in the manner in which two persons acquire the status of common-law marriage. This may sound as if it means that works of art are simply those things which certain people call works of art. However, the members of the artworld need not go through any sort of ceremony of naming something a work of art, they need not even actually call it a work of art; it is enough that they treat the work as art. The institutional theory, then, says that some individuals and groups in our society have an ability to change any artifact into a work of art by the simple action of conferring status upon it. This may take the form of calling something 'art', but more often amounts to publishing, exhibiting, or performing the work. This raises the question: from whence does this privileged cognoscenti, who make such decisions as to which artifacts should have status conferred upon them, gain their empowerment? Surely only the artists themselves are best qualified to confer status upon an artefact, thus transforming it into a work of art. But I would even question this in some circumstances, as so many, so-called, works of art are simply utilitarian objects put on display.

The institutional theory is circular, and Dickie, although he does see the problem of circularity, does not think that it is viciously circular, as is evident in his statement that:

"Admittedly, in a sense the definition is circular, but it is not viciously circular… because the whole account in which the definition is embedded contains a great deal of information about the artworld".

What the theory says is that art is whatever a certain group of privileged people choose to call art. This sounds like some form of linguistic gymnastics which could have disturbing political implications, if only people from a particular social class are endowed with the privilege to make such a choice. A defender of the theory might argue against this that the requirement that the work of art be an artifact, and the restriction of who is able to confer the status of candidacy for appreciation upon an it, are enough to give some content to the theory. If this is so, we need a more detailed account of precisely who is part of the artworld. Yet even if we did know who had this privilege of conferring status, and why they were entitled to it, we still would want to know why they choose one object rather than another to be considered as a work of art.

Dickie does not refute Ted Cohen's claim that an object must be capable of being appreciated in order for it to be possible to confer the status of candidacy for appreciation upon it; i.e. if something cannot be appreciated it cannot become a work of art. Therefore, we also need to know what kind of appreciation is being discussed in the term 'candidate for appreciation'. It is possible to appreciate an object in many ways, and for many reasons. What seems to be required is an aesthetic appreciation of a kind that is appropriate to works of art. Although Dickie argues that:

"the only sense in which there is a difference between the appreciation of art and the appreciation of nonart is that the appreciations have different objects. The institutional structure in which the art object is embedded, not different kinds of appreciation, makes the difference between the appreciation of art and the appreciation of nonart".

This only makes the theory more circular, it is merely defining art in terms of appreciation and appreciation in terms of art.

It can be argued that the institutional theory is a poor theory of art because it seems to justify the conferring of status upon the most superficial objects. Thus, being, as an artist, a member of the artworld, I could, by exhibiting it in a gallery, confer such status upon my left sock which has a hole in the toe. It does appear that this theory allows that almost anything could become a work of art. The conferral of status upon something does not mean that it is a good work of art, nor for that matter a bad one. It only puts the object into the class of things we call works of art; in other words it becomes a work of art in the classificatory sense only. This differs from the way in which we use the word 'art' not just to classify something, but often to suggest that it is good of its kind; for instance when we say things like 'that omelette is a work of art'.

This theory has nothing to tell us about such evaluative uses of the word 'art', it is a theory about what all works of art – good, bad, and indifferent – have in common; that is from the point of view of the representative of the artworld who confers the status upon it. It is only about 'art' in the classificatory sense. However, the majority of those people who ask the question 'What is art?' are not just interested in what we call art, but want to know why some objects are valued above others. It can be argued that theories such as the significant form, and the idealist theories are to a large extent evaluative. According to these theories, to call something a work of art is to say that it is good in some sense, either because it has significant form or because the artist has made a sincere attempt to convey the expression of an emotion. This theory, however, is extremely open about what can be counted as art and does not attempt to give an answer to evaluative questions about art. Some see this as its greatest virtue, whilst others see it as its most serious defect.

Dickie reminds us that what makes something a work of art is a cultural matter, dependent on social institutions at particular times rather than on some timeless canon. For example, the terracotta army – as with Dickie's Egyptian example – sealed in the Chinese Emperors tomb for his protection in the afterlife, whilst being regarded as works of art, work as a counter-example to the institutional definition since they were not put forward as 'candidates for appreciation' by an artworld. This shows us that our concept of art can be applied to the art of another culture without our knowing anything about its concepts of art, or even whether it has such a concept. Perhaps the most telling objection to the theory is that even if we agree that members of the artworld have the power to confer status upon artifacts, making them works of art, they must have reasons for conferring status upon some artifacts and not others. Oswald Hanfling puts this very point quite succinctly when he states:

"Someone who puts an object forward for appreciation must be prepared to answer the question 'Why?' – to tell us why it should be regarded as being worthy of this treatment; and the answer must be in terms of reasons that we can at least recognize as such".

If they don't have any logic behind what they do, then why should the category of art have any interest for us? And if they do have reasons, then these are what determine whether or not something is art. Analysis of these reasons would be far more interesting and informative than the rather empty institutional theory. This definition cannot truly be regarded as a useful definition because someone acting on behalf of the artworld could not properly utilize it to decide whether something is a work of art. A definition of X should give its consultant a measure of guidance as to whether any given object can be described as X or not. But, the person who has to make the decision, with regard to the conferral of status etc., has no appeal to any prior conferral of status to enable him/her make such a decision. It could therefore be argued that this theory would deprive such a person(s) of any reasons for classifying an object as a work of art.

So in conclusion, I hope that I have argued the case for indefensibility on the grounds that the theory is: (i) circular, which Dickie admits although he doesn't think it viciously so; (ii) reliant upon a privileged cognoscenti, who represent the artworld, to make decisions about what is and what is not art; (iii) it fails to distinguish good from bad art; and (iv) because the criteria used by the artworld do not form a completely workable definition which can be used to define a work of art. Hopefully I have made the best use of the space available, although such a topic really requires a far more detailed analysis.